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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN H. MORGAN, et al,

)
)

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

)
)

vs.

)

Case No. 14115

)

BOARD OF STATE LANDS OF
THE STATE OF UTAH, et al,

)
)
)

Defendants-Respondents.

)

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
Beginning in 1963, Appellants held State of Utah oil shale
leases which originally had ten year terms but which Appellants
believed to have been extended through 1983.

Respondents declared

the leases terminated as of December 31, 19#3, and denied extension,
This is an appeal from a summary judgment upholding Respondents
in their refusal to recognize the continuing validity of the
leases.
DISPOSITION BELOW
Appellants sued under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act for
a declaration that conduct of the parties had effected an extension
of the leases.

The parties conceded that their evidence (including

affidavits covering all testimony they would adduce at trial) was
before the court, and the court, on Respondents1 Motion for Suramary
Judgment, ruled that Appellants had no cause of action as a matter
of law.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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- 2 ISSUES ON APPEAL
The issues here presented are:
1.

Whether a jury could reasonably find that the
parties extended the leases by implied contract.

2.

Whether a jury could reasonably find that Respondents are estopped to deny the extension of the
leases and Appellants' opportunity to correct any
deficiency in their procedures for extension.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

For the purposes of this statement, the Board of State Lands
will be called the "Board", and its director (as of the time of
the action being described) will be called the "Director".
Appellants Morgan, Justheim and Justheim Petroleum Company will
be called the "Morgans", and Appellant Husky Oil Company will be
called "Husky".

The oil shale leases in questions will be called

the "Leases".
The chronology of relevant events is as follows:
1.

In 1963, the Board issued the Leases, to expire by their

terms on December 31, 19f3, to the Morgans (admitted in pleadings)
2.

In 1964, the Morgans assigned the Leases to Husky, but

remained the lessees of record to whom the Board sent notices and
billings (R.113).
3.

In 1965, the Board adopted a 20 year lease form, and

passed a resolution that lessees under previously issued oil
shale leases should have opportunity to convert to the nev; form
(R. 9-11, admitted
in W.pleadings).
Digitized by the Howard
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4.

On September 29, 1965, the Director sent to all oil

shale lessees a letter (herein called the "September Letter")
in which a procedure for converting to the new 20 year lease
form was explained (R. 21). That "procedure" was never included
in the "Conversion" section of the Board's Rules and Regulations
Governing Mineral Leases (herein called the "Regulations") even
though the Regulations were revised in November of 1965 and on six
occasions thereafter while the Leases were clearly in effect
(R. 153) and specifically covered conversion procedures (R. 165).
5.

The record does not show that either Husky or the Morgans

ever followed the conversion procedure suggested by the September
Letter.

The only evidence, however, (R. 114) is that they believed

they had done whatever was necessary to convert to the new form.
Their conviction was corroborated by the facts that:
(a) the Board, at some time between 1965 and 1973,
revised its accounting records for the Leases to show
their expiration in 1983 rather than 1973 (R. 43 and 50,
Response to Request No. 2 ) , and
(b) in the late fall of 1973, the Board sent Appellants
billings for the Leases covering the 1974 lease year, a
year during which the Leases would not even have been
operative unless they were extended.

The billings called

for rentals at a rate ($1.00 per acre) which could not
have been payable under the Leases as originally issued
(R. 114) .

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 4 -

6.

Within the 1973 lease year, Appellants paid the 1974

rentals for the Leases as billed by the Board (R. 114, 128).
Had they not been so billed, Appellants v/ould have made inquiry
to determine why they had not been billed and would have corrected
any claimed deficiencies in conversion procedure while the Leases
as originally issued were still in effect (R. 115).
7.

Early in 1974, after the Board had cashed Appellants'

rental payment check, the Board returned the money to. Appellants
with the announcement that it considered the Leases to have
expired (R. 50-52).
It is noteworthy that the Board has consistently expressed
its regret that it must treat the Leases as having expired.

The

Attorney General has issued his opinion that the Board is powerless to do otherwise.

It would be a mistake to approach the

matter as a problem related to the scope of administrative
discretion.

The Board does not purport to have had or exercised

discretion.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT, THE COURT
HAS RULED THAT THE EVIDENCE COULD NOT
SUPPORT JURY FINDINGS OF IMPLIED CONTRACT
OR ESTOPPEL
We need not labor the point that a summary judgment is
improper when there is any material issue of fact (see Dupler
v. Yates, 10 U2d 251, 351 P.2d 624; Tanner v. Utah Poultr" &
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Farmers Co-op, 11 U2d 353, 359 P.2d 18.

In Bullock v. Desert

Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 U2d 1, 354 P.2d 559, this Court
took a strong position, in accord with the prevailing view, that
summary judgment is proper only where the prevailing party shows
that his adversary could not, if given a trial, produce evidence
which would support findings in his favor.

At page 561 of the

Pacific report, this Court said:
"A summary judgment must be supported by
evidence, admissions and inferences which when
viewed in the light most favorable to the loser
shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law; such showing must
preclude all reasonable possibility that the loser
could, if given a trial, produce evidence which
would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor."
In the instant case, Appellants plead an implied contract
and, in the alternative, estoppel.

Appellants believed the

evidence (which will later herein be discussed in detail) justified
findings that an implied contract had been made as a matter of law,
and that all of the elements of estoppel were present.

The trial

court ruled that the evidence could not even justify a jury in
finding for Appellants on either the implied contract issue or
the estoppel issue.
While Appellants brought this action under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, they did not thereby waive their right to have
issues of fact presented to a jury.

This is the general rule in

America; American Jurisprudence states it, at 22 Am. Jur. 2d 960,
as follows:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"The courts, under the Uniform Declaratory
Judgments Act and similar statutes, as well as
under the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act, generally
recognize the right to jury trial on those issues
in regard to which either party could have claimed
a jury in any action for which the declaratory judgment action may be regarded as a substitute."
and this Court so held in Oil Shale Corporation v. Larson, 20
U2d 369, 433 P.2d 540.
Among issues historically submitted to juries in contract
cases are (1) v/hether conduct indicates a promise (see Peters
v. Poro, 96 Vt. 95, 117 A 244, 25 ALR 615), (2) renewal of a
contract (Adamson v. McKean, 208 Iowa 949, 225 NW 414), and
(3) authority to contract (Ogdensburg & LCR Co. v. Pratt, 22
U.S. 123, 22 L. Ed. 327.
2d 441, Trial Sec. 396.

In this connection, see 75 Am.Jur.
We submit that, while reasonable minds

might differ, a jury could find that the conduct of Respondents
in this case implied a promise to renew or extend the Leases.
Refering again to American Jurisprudence, its editors say:
"Where different conclusions may reasonably
be drawn by different minds from the same evidence,
the question is ordinarily one for the jury. This
is true not only where the uncertainty is caused
by a substantial conflict in the testimony, but
also where the facts are undisputed but are such
that different conclusions may reasonably be
drawn from them. ft (75 Am.Jur. 2d 394)
With regard to waiver and estoppel, American Jurisprudence
has this to say:
"Whether there has been a forfeiture of a
right is, when the facts are admitted or proved
and lead to only one reasonable inference, a question
of lav/ for the court; but where the facts out of which
the forfeiture is claimed to have arisen are in dispute
or different conclusions may be drawn therefrom, the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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question should be determined by the jury.
Whether there has been a waiver is generally
a question of fact, unless the facts and circumstances relating to the subject of waiver
are admitted or are clearly established, in
which case waiver becomes a question of law
if only one reasonable inference may be drawn
therefrom. Waiver of a forfeiture or of right
to a jury trial has been held to be for the
jury. Likewise, upon an issue of estoppel,
where only one inference can reasonably be
drawn from undisputed facts, the question of
estoppel is one of law for the determination
of the court, but where there is a dispute as
to the facts involving an estoppel, or more
than one inference may be drawn from undisputed
facts, the question becomes one for the triers
of fact—the jury in a case tried by a jury."
(75 Am.Jur.2d 432)

POINT II
THE EVIDENCE WOULD JUSTIFY A JURY IN
FINDING EXTENSION OF THE LEASES BY
IMPLIED CONTRACT
It is a well established principle of lav; that, in the
absence of a statutory provision to the contrary, the parties
to a written contract may modify it by parol, and the facts of
such modification may be implied by their conduct.
Juris statement on the subject is as follows:
M

A modification of a contract may be
effected by an explicit agreement to modify,
either in writing or by parol, as discussed
infra §377; but the agreement to modify a
contract need not be express, and the fact
of agreement may be implied from a course of
conduct in accordance with its existence, a~iT
discussed infra §375."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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"Unless otherwise provided by statute, it
is not essential that the mutual assent of the
parties to modify the contract be express, as
discussed supra §374, and it may be implied
from acts and circumstances. So, the fact
of agreement may be implied from a course of
conduct in accordance with its existence."
(17A CJS 424 and 427, excerpts from Sees.
374 and 375, with emphasis added)
This appears to be the law even though the parties may have
provided in their written agreement that modification must be
in writing.

The editors of American Jurisprudence (17 Am.Jur..

2d 937) say:
"The rule followed by the courts generally,
with some authority to the contrary, is that
although the parties to a contract may stipulate
that it is not to be varied except by agreement
in writing, they may, in the absence of statutory
provision to the contrary, by a subsequent contract
not in writing, modify it by mutual consent."
This Court had occasion to comment on the subject of implied
contract in Kimball Elevator Company v. Elevator Supplies Company,
2 U2d 289, 272 P.2d 583.

The facts in that case are not similar

to ours, but this Court there confirmed that, in Utah as elsewhere,
a contract may be established by conduct alone without any expression in writing or by parol.

The appropriate quote from the case

is as follows:
"It is of course conceded that a contract may
be made out even though there are no express words
formally stating it, and the promise may be inferred
wholly or in part from such conduct as justified the
promissee in understanding that the promissor intended
to make it."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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We find no Utah case where the promise inferred from
conduct was specifically to extend a lease.

There are,

however, a number of cases from other jurisdictions where
a lease extension has been held to have been effected by
implied agreement.

Among them are Walker v. Ferguson, 130

So. .64, 221 Ala. 549; Alhandy v. Gerchi, 202 Cal.Ap. 2d 806;
Ochsner v. Langendorf, 174 Pac. 392, 115 Colo 453; HeSweeney
v. Porn, 158 A 38, 104 Vt. 110; Smith v. Arthur D. Little,
276 Cal. Ap. 2d 391, Shell Oil Co. v. Marinello, 294 A 2d
598, 63 NJ 402.

The particular circumstances vary, of course,

from case to case, but the conduct of the parties in every case
was held to effect an extension.

We find no authority that a

promise to extend a lease is less easily inferable than any
other kind of promise.

In Ochsner, the extension was declared

on no other evidence than the lessor's acceptance of rental
after the term.

There was no evidence there, as here, that the

lessor had both billed and received rental for an entire year.
In the instant case, the conduct of the parties is in no
sense ambiguous.

The Board indicated its understanding that

the Leases were extended not only by amending its accounting
records to show an additional ten year account period but also
by billing and receiving 1974 rental at a rate v/hich could only
apply to a period beyond the initial term of the lease.

Appellants

indicated their understanding that the lease relationship was
now to be governed by the "new form" lease by paying the 197 4
rental at the new form rate before the 1974 lease had expired.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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The revision of accounting records, the billings of 1974
rentals, and the acceptance of 1974 rentals are not the only
pieces of conduct which (using the phraseology of KirabaU Elevator)
"justified" Appellants "in understanding that" the Board "intended
to" extend the Leases.

There is the further fact that the Board

failed to mention any conversion procedure for oil shale leases
in the Regulations even though a section of the Regulations is
devoted to "conversion", and the Regulations were revised in
November of 1965 and on several occasions thereafter.
The Board's failure to treat the procedure for converting
old form to new form oil shale leases in the Regulations is
particularly significant because it was under direct statutory
obligation to do so.

Section 65-1-96, UCA 1953 as amended 1967,

provides:
"All mineral leases issued by the land board
prior to the effective date of this act and in good
standing on such date shall continue for the term
specified therein and shall be subject to the conditions and provisions contained therein; provided,
however, the land board may permit such lessees to
convert such existing leases to the form of lease
which shall be adopted by the land board pursuant
to authority contained in this act, such conversion
to be in accordance with rules and regulations
promulgated by the land board."
After the effective date of this section, Appellants as holders
of previously issued oil shale leases were entitled to rely on
the Regulations as the authoritative source of information with
regard to conversion procedure.

Whatever may have happened to

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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their copy of the September Letter, Appellants were not obliged
to recognize it, even if they had constructive knowledge of its
content, as superior to regulation.

Since the September Letter

calls for an "application" to be filed for the new lease form,
the Board had a second statutory obligation to cover the subject
by "rules and regulations".

Section 65-1-23, UCA 1953 as amended,

provides:
"Except as otherwise provided by law, the
state land board shall by rules and regulations
prescribe the form of application, the form of
lease, the annual rental, the amount of royalty
and the basis upon which the royalty shall be
computed, and such other details as it may deem
necessary in the interest of the state."
Appellants could have perused all the Regulations and all applicable statutes without becoming aware of the content of the
September Letter.

In view of the quoted statute, they could feel

secure that there was no conversion procedure not covered by the
Regulations.
It appears to be Respondents' position that, once the September
Letter was transmitted, it was no longer possible for the principles
of implied contract to apply.

Since a written agreement can be

modified without writing even though it specifically provides to
the contrary (see authorities supra) we cannot accept the proposition that the September Letter put the Leases beyond the power of
the parties to modify the Leases by procedures other than those
suggested in the September Letter.

This is particularly true since

(1) the September Letter does not purport to state an exclusive
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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means of conversion, and (2) the September Letter was never
sanctified by any Board action reflected by the minutes (i.e.
the Director was never instructed or authorized to send it).
We cannot conceive that the September Letter supercedes the
Regulations, particularly on a subject which is statutorily required to be covered by regulation.
It is true that the January 20, 1965 Board minutes show
that "exchange" of leases was Board approved "on the basis of
6$£ per acre".

This is, in fact, the only minute entry which

speaks to the exchange or conversion fee question.

All applicable

minute entries are attached to the complaint (R. 9-10).

Nothing

in the Board's minutes of any meeting suggests that a failure
to pay the conversion fee within the original lease term will
terminate the lease without notice.

As a matter of practice,

lessees frequently rely on Section 65-1-90, UCA 1953 as amended,
which reads as follows:
"Upon violation by lessee of any lawful
provision in a mineral lease, the state land
board may, at its option, cancel the lease after
thirty days' notice by registered or certified
return receipt mail, unless the lessee remedies
the violation or rectifies the condition within
said thirty days or within such extension of time
as the board may grant."
As soon as Appellants became aware that a failure on their part
to pay a conversion fee was claimed, they undertook to pay the
fee, but payment was refused.

They were certainly given no thirty

day period within which to rectify a claimed delinquency.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT III
A JURY COULD REASONABLY FIND THE FACTS TO
BE SUCH THAT THE BOARD IS ESTOPPED TO DENY
THE EXTENSION OF THE LEASES
The concept of estoppel is well understood, and the court
which should require little citation of authority as to its
nature.

It applies whenever one party has reasonably acted (or

failed to act) to its detriment and was induced to so act or fail
to act by the conduct of the party against whom the doctrine is
invoked.

In. Farmers and Merchants Bank v. Universal CIT Corpora—

—

,

—

.

:

i

•

—

, fti

tion, 4 U2d 155, 289 P2d 1045, this Court quoted with approval
the following language from Fergason Co, v. Furst, 287 F. 306:
"Equitable estoppel is bottomed upon the
notion that, when one person makes representations
to another which warrant the latter in acting in a
given way, the one making such representations will
not be permitted to change his position when such
change v/ould bring about unequitable consequences
to the other person, who relied on the representations
and acted thereon in good faith. The representations
made must be in themselves sufficient to warrant the
action taken."
In this case, the conduct of the Board which induced Appellants to act as they did (i.e. pay the rentals and refrain from
an inquiry which v/ould have resulted in their following whatever
procedure the Board required for extension) was the publication
of the Regulations which said nothing about oil shale lease conversion and the transmittal of billings for the Leases covering
the 1974 lease year at a rate which was only consistent with an
accomplished substitution of the August 1965 oil shale lease form
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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for the lease form in which the leases had been issued in 1963.
That billing (coupled with the change in accounting records)
was an affirmative action by the Board unequivocal in its implications.

Appellants payment of 1974 rentals in 1973 was likewise

unequivocal.
It is recognized that estoppel has limited applicability
to government agencies.

The limitation applies only to situations

where the agency is acting in a governmental (as opposed to a
proprietary) capacity.

The editors of American Jurisprudence

(28 Am.Jur.2d 784) state the legal proposition as follows:
"Thus, as a general rule, the doctrine of
estoppel will not be applied against the state
in its governmental, public, or sovereign capacity,
unless its application is necessary to prevent
fraud or manifest injustice. The state cannot,
by operation of a mere estoppel in pais, be
deprived of its right to legislate, nor can
claims against the state be created by estoppel.
Under some circumstances, however, a state
may be held estopped if an individual would have
been held estopped. . . .
A state may be held
estopped when acting in a proprietary or contractual
capacity.3 Also, there is authority that a state
may be deemed estopped when the acts of its officials,
alleged to constitute the ground of estoppel, are
done in the exercise of powers expressly conferred
by law, and when acting within the scope of their
authority. So, a department of a state government,
in a matter of procedure and within the scope of
departmental powers, may be estopped."
Among the many cases cited under footnote 8 is
Utah Power & Light Company v. United States, 2 30 Fed.
328.
Obviously, the state acts in a proprietary capacity when
it enters into contracts with regard to state owned lands.

A

case directly in point is State ex rel Shell Oil Co. v. Register
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of State Land Office, 193 La. 883, 192 So. 519.

There, the

State attempted to declare a lease invalid because of irregularities in the procedures by which it had been offered two
years previously.

The court held that the state was estopped

to deny the lease validity after having accepted two years of
rentals under it.
We are not aware of a Utah case where estoppel has been
applied directly against the Utah State Land Board, but, in
Provo City Corporation v. Cropper, 28 U2d 1, 497 P.2d 629 (1972),
Provo City was held estopped to deny the dismissal of a condemnation suit after having made representations to the court, just
before trial, that the city was withdrawing.

The following is

the lead headnote from the Utah Reporter:
"Condemnor should not be permitted to
represent to court that action was to be abandoned
and dismissed for purpose of avoiding trial and
thereafter to contend that action was still pending
for purpose of avoiding payment of expenses and
attorney's fees. U.C.A."1953, 78-34-16."
Recently (1972) the Arizona Court held that estoppel applied
against a school district in its contractual relationship with a
teacher.

In Board of Trustees v. Wildermath, 10 Ariz. App. 171,

492 P.2d 420,.the court held the district was estopped to deny
that a teacher was covered by health insurance from the date of
employment even though the district's contract with its group
carrier provided otherwise.
We submit, in the instant case, that nothing about the
history of dealings between the parties obliged Appellants to
put a different connotation on the Board's conduct from the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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obvious one*

After (1) changing its accounting records, (2)

billing for 1974, (3) accepting the 1974 rentals as billed,
and (4) publishing its Regulations which were silent with regard
to any conversion procedure for oil shale leases, the Board is
estopped, at the very least, to deny Appellants 1 right to correct
whatever procedural deficiencies are now perceived.
POINT IV
THE ACTS OF THE BOARD, ITS DIRECTORS, AND
ITS EMPLOYEES ON WHICH APPELLANTS RELIED
ARE NOT VITIATED BY REASON OF LACK OF
AUTHORITY
The trial court specifically found that the conduct on which
Appellants relied (i.e. the amendment of accounting records, the
transmittal of 1974 billings, the acceptance of 1974 rentals,
and the failure to include oil shale lease conversion instructions
in the Regulations) was not "authorized" by any board minute entry
and that Appellants were therefore not justified in relying on
that conduct.
All of the conduct is clearly within the apparent authority
of the Respondents.

The statutes which are pertinent in this

regard are Sections 65-1-2.1 and 3.1 which read as follows:
"There is created the division of state lands,
which shall be within the department of natural
resources under the administration and general
supervision of the executive director of natural
resources and under the policy direction of the
board of state lands. The division of state lands
shall be the state land authority for the state
of Utah, shall assume all of the functions, powers,duties, rights and responsibilities of the state
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land board except those which are delegated to the
board of state lands by this act and is vested with
such other functions, powers, duties, rights and
responsibilities as provided in this act and other
law.
The director of the division of state lands
shall be appointed by the board of state lands with
the concurrence of the executive director of natural
resources. The director shall be the executive and
administrative head of the division of state lands
and shall be a person experienced in administration
of and a qualified executive in land management.
The director shall have executive authority and
control of the division and employees to the end
that the policies of the board may be carried out.
The director shall administer all land laws within
the jurisdiction of the division of state lands and
perform such other duties as may be provided for by
law."
The law has never excused any corporate body for the consequences of its agents' mistakes even though it is apodictic that
no employee is specifically authorized to make mistakes.

The

issuance of 1974 billings was clearly the act of the Director and
not some unidentifiable employee.

The Director f s name appears

at the bottom of the billing form, and recipients are justified
in accepting what appears on the form at face value.

It is para-

doxical that the trial court placedsuch emphasis on the absence
of a minute entry covering the revision of accounting records and
the issuance of billings for 1974 rentals when the court gave
supervening effect to the September Letter which was also unsanctif.ied by any minute entry.
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CONCLUSION
The record in this case would seem to compel and would
certainly support jury findings of implied contract between
the parties and the elements of equitable estoppel.

Appellants

clearly acted in good faith and have demonstrated every intention
to maintain the Leases.
The action of the trial court in this matter should be
reversed, and the cause remanded for trial of the fact issues.
Respectfully submitted,
FRANK J. ALLEN
351 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants
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